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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY S. ~[UHLBACH, 
Pla.intiff-RespondeHt, 
-vs.-





THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN IN-
STRUCTING ON THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DEFINE 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE 
HAZARD. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO KEEP A 
LOOKOUT. 
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POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT VERY PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT; AND THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED DE'FENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are not entirely in agreement with the 
Rtatmnent of fa.cts set forth in appellant's brief. 
The incident giving rise to thi~ legal action occurred 
on ~larch 15, 1962 (R. 1-t7, at about 6 :30 o'clock p.m. 
(R. 150, R. 126). 
The incident occurred at a ti1ne when it was still 
daylight, and visibility was good (R. 150). The weather 
was clear (R. 150). 
At the intersection of 13th East and the Cottonwood 
Diagonal, the roads are both asphalt-based roads. For 
all practical purposes, at the point of intersection, they 
are level and straight (R. 129). lmn1edia.tel~~ to the south 
of the intersection there is a stop sign on 13th East fac-
ing south, directing traffic proceeding north on 13th 
E'ast to stop (R. 129). The speed lin1it on the Cotton-
wood Diagonal at the ti1ue of the incident wa~ fifty 
miles per hour (R. 131). 
At the point of intersection of the two streets 13th 
' East runs north and south (see Exhibits 1P .and 9B). The 
Cottonwood Diagonal runs southwest-northeast at its 
intPr~eetion with 13th I1Jast (see Exhibits 1P and 9D). 
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Jl r. Jlnhlbaeh was proceeding northwest on the 
Cottonwood Diagonal (R. 147). As he approached the 
intPrSP<'tion of the Cottonwood Diagonal and 13th East, 
he saw thP light colon·d Olds1nobile being driven by the 
dPfendant, ~lr. Ilertig (R. 148). :Jir. ~luhlbach first saw 
~lr. Hertig's car when it was smne two to three hundr:ed 
feet south of the s.top sign on 13th East (R. 166). 
As ~[r. Th:fuhlbaeh "·as approaching the inters<>rtion, 
he was proct>eding down the Cottonwood Diagonal at 
about -tO 1nilPs per hour, hut as he neared the intersection, 
he slowPd to about thirt~·-five to thjrty-six miles per hour 
(R. 160 and R. 166). 
:Jlr. Hertig appt>ared to either cmnpletely or nearly 
stop for the stop sign (R. 162). Thir. ~Iuhlbach thought 
Mr. Hertig wowd remain stopped at the stop sign until 
:Jir. l\luhl'bach had passed (R. 149, 166). A.t any rah .. , 
~lr. :\Juhlbach blasted his large air horn to give addi-
tional warning to l\lr. Hertig (R. 149), but l\Ir. Hertig 
suddenly g-avE' a hurst of speed and shot right in front of 
~fr. ~[uhlbach (R.149). 
~Ir. Jed K. l\lel\IiUan, a witness who was proceed-
ing southeast on the Cottonwood Diagonal, noticed that 
the auton1o1bile being driven by l\Ir. Hertig appeared to 
be proceeding straight north on 13th East, brut following 
the blast of the air horn, 1nade a hasty left turn down 
the Diagonal, and that the Hertig car was under such 
heavy acceleration that it appeared to "fishtail" down 
the Diagonal (R. 270, 271). 
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~lr. Thluhlbach carne so close to Mr. Hertig that he 
thought he had hit him; in fact, he was so close that Mr. 
1\Iulbach couldn't see the top of ~Ir. Hertig's automobile 
because the top of Th:Ir. 1\Iuhlbach's fender obstructed 
his view (R. 168). l\Ir. 1\Iuhlbach then veered his truck 
to the right in order to avoid a collision with the Hertig 
vehicle and then rolled over and slid down into the ditch, 
darnaging his vehicle (R. 150). 
Thlr. Hertig then proceded down the Diagonal at a 
spP(~d of about fifty ruiles per hour (R. 1S7) until an 
individual stopped 1\lr. Hertig and said that a truck had 
just about run into the rear end of his car and that he had 
better go back (R.185). 
:Mr. Hertig admits that he never did see 1\Ir. 1\Iuhl-
bach'~ truck until he had been rturned to the scene of the 
incident and saw it in the ditch (R. 185). 
ARGP:JIENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN IN-
STRUCTING ON THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE. 
The Court presented the doctrine of sudden enler-
grney to the jur:· in instruction No. 16 (R. 94), a~ follows: 
"One who, in a sudden emergency, acts ac-
cording to his best judgment, or who, because of 
lack of time .to form a judgment, omits to act in 
the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with 
contributory negligence, provided he exercise~ 
in the en1ergency the care of a reasonable prudent 
individual under li!ke ci rcurnstances. 
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"In ~urh a :-;ituation, hi:-; duty is to exerei:-;E> 
only the degree of care which an ordinary pn1dent 
person would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. If, at that n1mnent, he exercises 
such care, he does all the law requires of hiin, even 
though, in the light of after-events, it might ap-
pear that a different choic-e and manner of action, 
would have been better and safer." 
This type of instruction was approved in a Utah 
ease entitled, Redd v. Airu;ay il/otor Coach Lines (1943) 
104 lT.9, 137 P.2d 37-t, 377. 
The law is c.Iear that the plaintiff is not burdened' 
with the duty of requesting the Court to give instructions 
which set up defenses cla1ned by the defendant. 
Plaintiff, in proposing an instruction on his theory 
of the ease, is not required to also propose instructions 
setting out all of the possible defenses thereto. If de·-
fendant desires instruction on defenses to any ground 
which would allow plaintiff to recover, he should propose 
them. 
Defendant did not request any instructions whatso-
ever on the sudden mnergenc.y doctrine. 
Defendant cites in his brief the California case of 
Jones v. Henrick, 49 Cal. App. 2d 702, 122 P.2d 304; how-
ever, this case specifically points out that in that case, 
the c01nplaining party requested the Court to place a 
lin1itation on the instruction given by the Court. 
Instruction N·o. 16 very succintly st~a.tes what de-
gree of care is to be expected from an individual acting 
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in ernergent:·. It left opt>n to the jury the question of 
whether or not an einergency, in fact, existed. 
vVhile the appellant contends that the giving of this 
instruction took the question of contributory negligence 
from the jury, it should be pointed out that the jury was 
very carefully instructed that none of the instructions 
given should he considered alone, and that they should all 
he considered with reference to one another. The entire 
eharge given to the jury very carefully and accurately 
placed the question of contributory negligence before 
the jury. 
Instruction ~ o. 2S as given by the Court (R. 106) 
states: 
"These instructions, though numbered sepa-
rately, are to be considered and construed by you 
as one connected whole. Each instruction should 
be read and understood with reference to and as 
a part of the entire charge and not as though one 
instruction separately was intended to present the 
whole law of the eas·e on any paxtieular point. 
For that reason, you are not to single out any 
certain sentenee or any individual point or in-
struction and ignore the others, but ~~ou are to 
eonsider all the instructions, as a "·hole, and to 
regard each in the light of all the others." 
Ins.truetions No. 13 (R. 91), 14 (R. 92) and 13 (R. 
~)~)) clear]~· set forth contributory negligenee as a defense. 
It is clPar the trial court correctly instructed the 
jur~· a1-1 to the law applicable to the cas·e. 
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rfhe insh11ction 011 ~udden Pmergeney left it Up to the 
jur~· to detennine whether or not a sudden einerg·ency 
in fact, Pxisted. The instruction deals only with the se-
quence of evenhi occurring after an einergency c01nes into 
Pxistance. 
If the jury wPre to have found that the plaintiff was 
negligent prior to the existance of an einergency, h~· vir-
tue of the other instructions contained in the charge, 
they \\·ere instructed that if such negligence proximately 
contributed to the plaintiff's injury, that they should 
find the issue in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiflf and return a verdict, "No cause of action." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO DEFINE 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE 
HAZARD. 
It should be noted that since 1961, the laws with 
respect to rights of way between vehicles while one is 
n1aking a left turn, between vehicles entering open inter-
sections, and vehicles entering through highways from 
stop signs, have been mnended. Prior to recent amend-
Inents, in the ease of vehicles entering open intersec-
tions at right angles to one another, our laws were such 
that we actually created a rac-e between the two vehicles 
in that the one first entering the intersection had the 
right of way and was deen1ed the favored driver. 41-6-72 
l' tah Code Annotated 1953 'vas amended to read that 
when vehicles entered an intersection at right angles to 
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one another and at appro.rimately (italics ours) the 
S'an1e time the vehicle to the left shall yield the right 
' 
of wa:v to the vehicle on theright. 
\Ve had a situation prior to 1961, by virtue of 41-6-73 
Utah Code Annotated in which if two vehicles were pro-
ceeding in opposite dir·ections and one intended to make 
a left turn, the one so intending to make a left turn 
should have yielded the right of way to any vehicle ap-
proaching frorn the opposite direction which \Vas within 
the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. Apparently this had been interpreted to mean 
an immediate ha:zJard at the time the driver intending to 
make a left turn co1n1nenced his left turn. In 1961, this 
statute was amended by adding, "during the time when 
such driver is Inoving within the intersection." The ef-
fect of this amend1nent is to prohibit the left turn if an 
im1nediate hazard would be created at any ti1ne while 
the driver 1naking a lelft turn was in the intersection. 
Likewise, in 1961 the law concerning entering a 
through highway from a stop sign was amended to 1nake 
right-of-way Inore definite; in 1961 the legislature en-
acted +1-6-7-l-.10, sub-section (b) of which proYides: 
"Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection. 
Except when directed to proceed by a police of-
ficer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a 
vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated 
by a s'top sign shall stop as required by section 
41-6-99 and after having stopped shall yield the 
right-of-way to an~~ vehicle which has entered the 
intersection fro1n another highwa~~ or which is 
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approaching so dosely on another highway as to 
constitute an i1n1nediate hazard during the t·i me 
wheu s1tch driver is mov-i-nq across or within the 
intersection." (it·alics ours), 
rrlw experience of several decades of high-speed 
nwtor travel has demanded laws he Inore definite in the 
area of right of way. It is obvious tha1Inodern high speed 
travel on freeway-type highways would be ilnpossible 
if driver:-; approaching such highways could enter there-
on and loiter aero:-;s the highway while approaching traf-
fic wa:-; proceeding at high rates of speed and in possibly. 
as n1a.n ~- as six l~anes of tra!ffic. 
,.rhe 1961 Legislature wisely added the phrase to 
our laws dealing with entering through-highways from 
side roads controlled by stop signs to include the phrase, 
"during the tin1e when such driver is 1noving across or 
within the intersection." 
Prior to the 1961 mnendment, the point of time used 
to detennine whether or not other vehicles approaching 
constituted an ilnmedi,ate hazard was apparent the in-
stant the driver entering from the side road was entering 
the intersect,ion. The .amend1nent changed the period of 
ti1ne for detennination of what constituted an immediate 
hazard to include all of the time during which the driver 
entering the through-highway was moving across or with-
in the intersection. 
It should be noted that the cases cited by appellant 
in his brief under Point II were decided prior to 1961, 
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and in light of recent an1endn1ents, are no longer ap-
plicable. 
It should also be notieed fron1 the defendant's re-
quested instructions (R. 51-77) that defendant failed to 
rP<luest an appropriate instruction dealing with the defi-
nition of ''im1nediate hazard." 
The evidence showed that when :Mr. Hertig had 
straightened out his autOinobile after ma:king his left turn 
to proceed northwest on the Cottonwood Diagonal, the 
truck belonging to the plaintiff was at his side. The 
1estimon~· of ill r. Hertig, which appears in the record at 
pages 2:25 and 226 clParly indicates this. The question 
wa~ asked: 
"So, it is quite probable, is it not, that, at the 
ti1ne you looked in your rear view nlirror, when 
you had straightened out, that the reason you 
didn't see the truck was because it would be n1ore 
or less to your side?" 
Answer: ''Yes, I "~ould say so; at least, not 
directly behind me." 
It is evident that when ~lr. Hertig ·was commencing 
his left turn, the plaintiff had taken evasive action and 
swPrved to the right so that while ~Ir. Hertig \Yas still 
in the intersection 1naking his left-hand turn, the plain-
tiff was to the right side of ~Ir. Hertig in the intersec-
tion. 
It is obvious that ~Lr. 1\Iuhlbach's truck was so close 
to the intersection at the time Mr. Hertig comn1enced 
proceeding through the interse·ction that there was an 
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inunediate hazard. rrlw question of whether or not ~I r. 
~I uhl1bach':-; truck constituted an immediatP hazard i:-; a 
quP:-;tion of fad, and not IH·ee:-::-;aril~· a question of law . 
. A ppPllant HPPlll:-; to lay great ::-;treHH on the case of 
f(iclwrd ... .- 1' • . Audersou (1959) 9 U.2d 17, 337 P.2d :J9. 
Fir:-;t, it i~ to be ren1e1nberPd that this l'ase was decidPd 
prior to recent a1nend1nents above referred to and i~ no 
longer applicable; and second, that in the Richards v . 
... !ud e rso n, <'asP, the vehicle entPring frmn the stopsign 
was proceeding at what may be regarded a~ an unusually 
slow ~peed. 
Prior to the recent mnendment, the point of time 
for detef1nining whether an inunediate hazard would ex-
i~t wa:-; apparPntly the instant a driver entered a through-
highway fron1 a stopsign. In light of recent amend1nents, 
a~ the ti1ne for determining whether an innnediate hazard 
Pxi:-;t~ include~ all of the tirne the driver entering from 
the ~top sign is \\·ithin the intersection, it is suggested that 
the Richard,..,· 1·. A 11derson case i8 no longer controlling. 
It is also important to note that in the Richards v. 
Audersun case, the vehicle entering the through highway 
frmn the stop sign was proceeding at an average speed 
of about five miles per hour. In the case now pending 
before the Supreme Court on appeal, the individual enter-
ing the through highway fron1 the stop sign did so at 
extrmne acceleration (R .. 271). 
\YherP one driver enters a through highway fron1 a 
stop sign tmder heavy acceleration and forees another 
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driver on the through highway off the roadway, it does 
not seetn that ·a finely -detailed instruction on what con-
~titutes an inunediate hazard would serve any useful 
purpose. The words, "im1nediate hazard" are not ·rubove 
the comprehension of layman. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO KEEP A 
LOOKOUT. 
Appe1lant urges under Point III of his brief that the 
lower court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
each driver had a duty to keep a lookout and that it was 
negligence to fail to see what was plain to be seen. This 
statement by appellant is not entirely correct. The court, 
in instruction 13 (R .. 91), instructed the jury as follows. 
"It was the duty of Harry S. Muhlbach to 
use reasonable care under the circumstances in 
driving ills truck to avoid danger to himself and 
others and to observe and to be aware of the con-
dition of the highway, the traffic thereon, arul 
other existing cond·itions; in that regard, he was 
obliged to observe detail in respect to : 
"(A) Keep a proper lookout for o·ther ve-
hcles or other condit~ons reasonably to be antoici-
pated. * * *" (italics ours) 
In a following instruction given by the court, in-
struction 15 (R. 93), the jury was instructed as follows: 
"Bef?re. contributory negligence would pre-
clude plaintiff's recovery, you must find from a 
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preponderance of the evidem·p that each of the 
following propositions are true: 
··Proposition No. One: 
"That the plaintiff was negligent in the oper-
ation of his truck just before the alleged incident 
in one or Inon· of the following particulars: 
"(a) ••• 
,. (b) ••• 
"(c) 'l,hat plaintiff was maintaining a look-
out; or •••." 
Throughout the instructions, the jury was adequatP-
lr instructed tha1t negligence consisted of doing or failing 
to do what a reason~ble, prudent p<'rson would not have 
or would have done under the cireuutstances. It is obvi-
ous that under the instructions as given, the jury would 
have had litth· trouble in ascertaining that failure to s-ee 
what was readily available to be seen constituted negli-
gence. 
Defendant's requested instruction 16 was properly 
refused in that it does not state the law. H fails to take 
into account the right of an individual using an arterial 
highway to assmne reasonalble and lawful conduct on the 
pa1,t of others until such time as something would occur 
to place him on notice to the contrary. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT VERY PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT; AND THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERICT. 
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Defendant seen1s to cmnpletely overlook the fact that 
plaintiff had the right to rely on safe and rea~onable con-
duct on the part of others using the highway until such 
ti1ne as, in the exercise orf due care, he noticed or should 
have noticed smnething to the contrary. 
Mr. H ert:ig was obliged to stop ot the stop .sign and 
yield the ·right of way to plaintiff. -17-6-74.10 (b), Utah 
Code Annot:ated 1953, provides : 
''Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection. 
Ex,cept when directed to proceed by a police offi-
cer or traffic control signal, every driver of a 
vehicle approaching a stop interseCJtion indicated 
by a ,stop sign shall 8top as required by Section 
41-6-99, and after having stopped', shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle which has entered 
the interse'ction frmn another highway or which 
is approaching so closely on another highway as 
to constitute an immediate hazard during the 
time when such driv-er is moving acro'Ss or with-
in the intersection." 
Mr. Hertig w.as obliged to stop and yield the right 
of way to plaintiff, and should not have entered the inter-
section while the plaintiff's vehicle or any other vehicles 
were approaching so closely as to cons,titute an imme-
diate hazard during the time _Mr. Hertig's vehicle was 
moving acros~s or within the intersection. 
Mr. Muhlbach had the right to rely on the assump-
tion that Mr. Hartig would stop or remain stoppe-d at 
the stop sign unt,il he observed, or in the exercise of due 
care shou-ld have observed, something to warn him to the 
contrary. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
In both the <·a~t·~ of illarfin r. Stevens, lD:J~, 1~1 U. 
-!S-1-, ~+3 P.~d 747 and Peter .... ·ou r. N1'else11, 1959, 9 lT.~d 
:HI~. :;-t:; P.~d 731, the Supre1ne Oourt of the StatP of 
lltah lm~ ('learly pronounced the law with respect to 
the degree an individual is ·entitled to rely on ~afe and 
rpm.;onabh• conduet of others, especially a-t intersections 
whPre one driver i~ favored with the right of way. 
In the case of Peterso11 r. Nielson, plaintiff's vehide 
\ra~ traveling· down a highway at about sixt)· miles per 
hour. Defendant approached the highway from a side 
road which apparently intersected the highway at a 90-
degree ang·le. As he approached, he stopped a1t a stop 
sign, and then without looking and observing plaintiff's 
car, proceeded out onto the highway. A collision re-
~ulted. 
In the Pete·rson v. ~: ielson case, the trial court dis-
Inissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that plaintiff was 
traveling at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent, 
that she failed to sound her horn, and that she failed to 
observe the defendant had his attention focused on an-
other automobile. The Supre1ne Court of the State of 
Utah reversed the trial court and very succincJtly stated 
the law in the State of Utah, as follows: 
''Having observed the defendant stop as he 
was about to enter the highway, at any time after 
plaintiff was close enough to constitute an imme-
diate hazard to him, she could assume that he 
would remain stopped and accord her the right 
of way. She could continue to rely on that as-
sumption until she observed, or should have ob-
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served, something to warn her to the contr~ry. 
It may be true that a high degree of caution 
would have impelled her to apprehend t~at the 
defendant might suddenly dart onto the highway 
in front of her. But she was not obliged to do so. 
While extraordinary caution is commendable, it 
is not required as a ·standard otf conduct. The 
concept of contributory negligence must not be 
so extended as to require one to drive under the 
apprehension that the other driver will be guilty 
of a sudden burst of negligence. If .all drivers 
were required to be that cautious and await upon 
each other, it would 'Seriously impede the move-
ment of traffic and make driving upon modern 
high speed arterial highways quite impractical. 
"The prdblen1 then is: at the instant defend-
ant S'ta~ted up from his stopped position, was 
the plaintiff far enough to the north that she 
could have avoided the collision¥'' 
In the case now pending before the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah on appeal, it is to be remembered 
that the plaintiff, Mr. lVluhlbach, anticipated ~:lr. Hertig 
would remain stopped at the stop sign until ~:lr. ~fuhlbach 
had proceeded pa!S't the intersection (R. 149-166). When 
)Jr. Muhlbac!h blas1ted his ~air horn, the defendant sud-
denly and unexpectedly shot out in front of plaintiff, 
forcing him off the highway (R. 149). 
Appellant seems to argue that plaintiff was contri-
butorily negligent for having failed to see defendant in 
ti1ne to avoid the situatioin which forced him off tlhe 
roadway; however, ~the real question is whether or not 
a reasonable, prudent person would have been able to 
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:letenuine dPfendant wa:-: not going to ~top or rematn 
stopped at tlw stop sign in enough tinte so that sai<i 
t·easonable, prudent person could have ta:ken evasive 
action and avoided a collision and being forced off the 
highwa~·. Defendant's proof wai-i lacking in this regard, 
n.nd plaintiff contends that in light of defendant's sud-
den burst of speed, a reasona:bl~. prudent person would 
not have been able to avoid being forced off the highway, 
as was the plaintiff, ~I r. lVIuhlbac!h. 
Appellant attentpts to prove contributory negligence 
on the part of the pl,aintiff through the use of a state-
Inent given h~· plaintiff to the investigating officer follow-
ing the roll-over. During the invP~tigation following the 
roll-over, Offi~er Keith I'ba asked Mr. ~Luhlbach ''how 
man~· feet it was he first noticed danger of the aerident" 
(R. 180). "He (.M~lhlbach) told 1ne it was thirty feet 
away" (R. 180). 
It should be noted that .Mr. 1\luhlbach did not say the 
e.ar of .Mr. Hertig was thirty feet away "\vhen he first 
noticed it, but his state1uent indicates it was thirty feet 
.away when danger of the accident becmne apparent. 
This statement should be reviewed in light of existing 
circutnstances. 
During the trial, defendant introduced a statement 
taken frmn l\[r. Jed I~. ~~c~lillan, an independent wit-
net't'. This exhibit wa~ designated, "Exhibit 11D". In 
the exhibit, l\lr. ~Ic~Iillan strutes 'vhat he observed when 
he arrived at the scene of the incident, as follow:;; : 
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"The driver was pulling himself up out of the 
truck. He was in a state of shock. He did not say 
anything, as he was in a daz·e. I sat him to the side 
of the road." 
It i~ raNwr apparent that _j1r. nluhlbach was severally 
shaken up as a result of the roll-over. 
\Vhen yon consider that the veer n1arks left by plain-
tiff's ~truck commenced some thirteen feet southeast of 
the intersection ( R. 128) and when you consider that at 
thirty-five mile·s per hour, tJhe plaintiff would travel over 
thivty-eight feet during a three-quarters of a second 
reaction timt>, it is obvious from the physical evidence 
that plaintiff did observe the dange1r when he was more 
than ·1fuirty feet away fr01n the defendant's automo1bile. 
It is folly to assume that an individual suddenly 
confronted with an apparent collision, or the danger 
thereof, would very carefully calculate how 1nany feet 
away from various objects he "ras a:t that point. 
At best, all that can be said of the staten1enrt con-
cerning the thirty feet so often referred to is that it was a 
guess given by an individual who had been severally 
shaken up as a result of being jostled about in a large 
truek ~which rolled over and which was not apparently 
correct in view of physical evidence found at the scene 
of the collision. 
T'he Supre1ne Court of the State of Utah very wise-
ly pointed out in the case of Gittens v. Lundberg (1955) 
~ U.2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115: 
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"It is not a prerequisite to credibility that a 
witness be entirely accurate with respect to every 
detail of his testinwny. If it were so, hu1nan frail-
ties are ~ twh that it would be seldon1 that a wit-
ness who testified to any extent could be believed. 
The jury 1nay evaluate thP testimony of witnesses 
and accept those parts wthich they deem credible, 
even though there be some inconsistencies." 
Sergeant Pitcher's te:stimon~· was helpful in s01ne 
areas in that he wm; able to explain to the jury what a 
reaction ti1ne is and was able to explain several other 
bas ie factors. Howev-er, beyond fuat, his testin1ony was 
of little help. Certainly the testimony of Sergeant Pitch-
er did not es'tablish any facts which could be relied upon 
on the real and ilnportant questions involved in this law-
~nit. 
While defendant Hertig ad1nitted that he accelerated 
to the speed of fifty Iniles per hour (R. 187), at which 
speed he proceeded down the Oottonwood Diagonal, the 
calculations upon which appellant relies are based upon 
an average speed fron1 the intersection to a red mark 
drawn on an exhibit of ten 1niles per hour. As there 
never was an accurate calibration of defendant's speed 
to that point, and in view of tihe fact that the ·witness, 
Jed K. ~Icl\Iillan, noticed defendant's vehicle "fishtail" 
under heavy acceleration (R. 270-271), the figure of ten 
miles per hour is, in fact, unrealistic. 
A red mark was drown on Exhibit 9D by defendant 
Hertig as his approximation of where he was when he 
c01nmenced making a left turn. There was no ph~~sical 
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evidence at the scene of the collision which would indicate 
exactly where thi'S point was. The n1ere f.a.ct that this red 
1nark was placed on a scale drawing does not take it out 
of the realn1 of speculation. As it app:e.ared to both 
Harry ~Iuhlbach and the independent witness, :.Mr. Jed 
K. McMillan, that the defendant, :Mr. Hertig, was going 
to proceed nortl~ on 13th East (R. 149, R. 270, R. 271) 
but made a very hurried left turn upon hearing the 
blast of the .air horn, the g:r:eat weight of the evidence 
would tend to indicate that :Mr. Hertig did not place 
the red mark on the drawing where it should have been 
placed. 
Based upon an unknown, that being the average 
speed of defendant Hertig from the stop sign into the 
distance to the red 1nark, Sergeant Pitcher atten1pted to 
intersection, and another llll!known, the hypothetical 
establish how far away from the intersection the plain-
tiff was when Mr. H·ertig left the stop sign. In addition, 
Sergeant Pitcher, by his own adnrission, did not take 
into consideration the factors of judgment time and 
break lag time, which he admits should have been taken 
into consideration (R. 255, 261, 262). 
Such flimsy evidence was c:learly not a basis for 
setting aside the ve:nlict of the jury, nor could it reason-
ably fonn a basis for a directed verdict or new trial. 
AppeHant see1ns to completely overlook an individu-
al's right to rely upon the reasonable conduc.t of others 
until something happens which should place hi1n on notice 
to the contrary. If the law placed a burden upon drivers 
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u~ing artPrial highway~ to anticipate negligent, rPekh_·~~, 
OI' other unl,awful conduct on the part of others, there is 
no qtw~.tion but what the flow of traffic would be seri-
ously impeded. If a driver using an arterial highway 
were under a duty to slan1 on his brakes or slow down 
suddenly when he saw a driver approa~hing the highway 
frmn a side road controlled by a stop sign, the danger 
of rear end collision would greatly outweigh an~· advan-
tage to be gained therefrmn. 
Questions of whether or not plaintiff was negligent 
in any respect, whether his negligence, if any, constituted 
a factor which proximately contributed to the roll-over, 
the question of the extent to which he could rely on 
reasonalble conduct on the part of othm:s until some-
thing warned him to the contrary, are all jury questions. 
The case of Mart,in v. Stepens (1952) 121 U. -1:84, 243 
P.2d 7-l-7, clearly states these n1atters to be questions for 
the jury. 
It is elmnentary that unless it could be said that 
reasonable minds could not differ on a proposition, it 
should be le'ft to jury. If in this case there are any ques-
tions upon which reasonaJble minds could not differ, they 
should have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant. If we are to say that anyone "Tas 
negligent as a n1atter of law, it can only be said that the 
defendant was negligent as a matter of law for failing 
to have observed plaintiff's truck as it proceeded to-
wards and entered the intersection. It could only be said 
that defendant was negligent as a matter of law for 
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failing to stop or reinain stopped at the stop sign and 
for having failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff. 
In any event, the jury decided the issues in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant under proper 
instruction from the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
IN CONCLUSION, THE JUDGMENT IN THE 
LOWER COURT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED, AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT -
SHOULD BE A. WARDED COSTS. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK, JOHNSON, 
SCHOENHALS & ROBERTS 
903 Kearns Building 




430 Judge Building 
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